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Abstract: Egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalizing some
objective standard of individual well-being, such as primary goods, functioning, or
resources, rather than subjective welfare.   This discussion, however, has assumed,
implicitly, a static environment, with a single or perhaps a small number of generations.
By studying the problem of equality of opportunity in a society that survives for many
generations, we demonstrate that equality of opportunity for some objective condition of
individuals is incompatible with a natural notion of human development over time.   We
argue that this incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare.   
Thus, ‘subjectivism’ seems necessary if we are to hope for a society which can both
equalize opportunities and support the development of human capacity over time.
1. Introduction
Egalitarians -- and more specifically, socialists -- have long cherished two ideals:
that that society is best which promotes human development over time and equality of
condition among members of society
2.  More recently, since Rawls’s rejuvenation of
egalitarian studies, several qualifications have been put forth as to what the equalisandum
should be.  Most, although not all participants in the discussion, have advocated what I
call an objectivist view, that the equalisandum should be something which is measurable
                                                
1 Dept of Economics, University of California, Davis.   I am grateful to Alberto Bisin for some useful
discussions of dynamic programming, and to Birgit Grodal.
2 Socialists have said (before consciousness about gender-neutral language) that, in the good society there
will be ‘self-realization of man’ and ‘self-realization of men.’  The latter means that, over the course of a
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to mean ‘self-realization of man.’2
independently of the views of the individuals who have it -- primary goods, functionings,
or resources  ( Rawls, Sen, and Dworkin, respectively).  The principal non-objectivist
equalisandum is, of course, welfare or utility, which can only be measured knowing the
utility function of the individual in question, and can only be compared interpersonally if
an interpersonally comparable unit scale exists.   None of the major writers advocates
equality of welfare as an ethic.
Moreover, in recent years, various theories of equal opportunity have been
proposed.   These certainly include Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), and Roemer (1998),
and I would say that Dworkin’s (1981) equality-of-resources is indeed an equal-
opportunity theory as well.   So we might well say that egalitarians advocate, as well as
human development, equality of opportunity for some condition.  That condition could,
as before, be something objective like functionings or primary goods, or the subjective
welfare.
What I claim to show below is that the three desiderata
·  protracted human development
·  equality of opportunity for some condition
·  the condition be an objective characteristic of the individual
are inconsistent.  Because, as I said,  the first desideratum makes sense only if we are in a
dynamic context, equality of condition, or equality of opportunity for some condition,
becomes equality (of opportunity) among all adults who ever live. My claim says that if3
the equalisandum is objective -- something like functioning -- then achieving such
equality will imply the absence of human development over time.    It is only by taking
the equalisandum to be ‘welfare’  (of a particular kind), a non-objectivist concept, that
equality of opportunity is consistent with human development.
If my claimed inconsistency is correct, then we (socialist egalitarians) are faced
with a choice: either dropping our advocacy of equality (of opportunity), or of human
development, or of objectivist equalisanda.  I think that the most attractive choice is to
drop the objectivist view.
In other words,  I claim to show that, if we move away from the static thought
experiments conducted by Rawls and the ‘objectivists’, then objectivism ceases to be
attractive (if it ever was).  I must say, however, that my inquiry does not show that justice
requires that we endorse subjectivism (the view that welfare is what must count for an
egalitarian).  For I advocate dropping objectivism because of its inconsistency with
equality of opportunity and human development;    and while the equality-of-opportunity
part of that compound phrase refers to a state of justice, the ‘human development’ part
does not.   That is, I do not claim that justice requires human development, or even, more
weakly, that justice requires human development in an environment where human
development is possible.  Human development over time is, for me, an obvious good, but
I do not know what to call the state of a society which has it, the way a society that has
equality of opportunity is one in a state of justice.4
2.  The dynamic environment
There is a society that exists for many (an infinite) number of generations.  At
each generation there are adults and children.  Each adult has one child, and so the
population size is constant.  Adults, at least at the beginning date 0, have different wage
rates -- indeed, we shall seek simplicity by declaring that only two wage rates exist at
date 0.  Taxation of adult income is used to finance education of that generation’s
children, as well as to redistribute income among adults.
We suppose that an adult’s wage is a measure of her family’s socio-economic
status (SES), where SES has an impact on the docility
3 of children.  More specifically,
the economic outcome of educating a child is the wage he will earn as an adult, and it
takes more educational resources to bring a low SES child up to a given adult wage rate
than a high SES child.   We take the view that all children have identical talent,  and that
the wage a child eventually earns as an adult is a function of his talent, the educational
resources invested in him, and the SES status of his parent.  To be specific, we suppose
there is a function h: R ® R, such that a child of a parent who has a wage of w  will, as
an adult, earn a wage of h(x)w, if x is the fraction of GNP per capita that is invested in
him through the educational process.   OECD countries invest approximately 5.5% of
GNP in education, which engenders growth in real wages across generations.  We might5
therefore conjecture that h(.04)=1 -- that is, that 4% of GNP invested in education would
maintain constant real wages.  We will suppose that h is concave, increasing, and
differentiable,  that h(0) = 0 and h(a) =1, where a is a number like 0.04.
Our economic environment dispenses with two important aspects of reality -- that
children are differentially talented, and that children expend differential effort
4.
Naturally, I motivate these two assumptions by saying I think they are unnecessary to
expose the problem I want to concentrate upon.    One might challenge the assumption
that h(0) = 0, and I will bring that issue up again later.
Capital and natural resources exist only implicitly in this model.
At each generation, adults must tax themselves, and the tax revenues must be
distributed in some way between the two types of child, those from low wage parents and
those from high wage parents.  The result of that education will be adults at the next date
who have (perhaps) two wage levels, and the problem repeats itself.  Our problem is to
find the sequence of adult tax rates and educational finance decisions which will
maximize the level of ‘welfare’ experienced by the worst-off adult who shall ever live.
We shall suppose that taxation takes the following form.  First, all adult incomes
are pooled, and each adult receives the average income.  Then each adult pays the same
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talent.  This is formally equivalent to the model as I have described it, yet might lead to different ethics.
(Some would say that it's all right for low talent people to earn less than high talent people, although it's not6
fraction of her income as a tax.  At date 0, fraction fL of the adults earn the low wage wL
0,
and fraction fH earn the high wage, wH
0.  Thus, fL+fH = 1, and we define mean income at
date 0 as m
0 =    fLwL
0 + fHwH
0
.  If the tax rate is t




We wish to abstract from incentive problems; in particular, taxation does not alter
labor supply, nor does anticipation of their future after-tax income alter how hard
children work in school.  These would be poor assumptions if we were interested in
advising policy-makers, but our investigation here is of a different kind.  We are
interested in exposing certain logical inconsistencies in a conception of ‘the good
society’, and it is appropriate for this inquiry to assume that individual citizens are almost
perfectly cooperative.  We limit their cooperative spirit only by assuming that private
incentives would come into play if we redistributed adult income so that low wage
earners ended up with more income that high wage earners.  (The best we can do is
equalize all after-tax incomes.)
In the theory of equal opportunity ( see Roemer [1998]), it is assumed that
individuals have different circumstances and exert different efforts.  Here, we abstract
from differential effort.   A person’s circumstances -- those characteristics beyond his
control that influence his outcome -- are two in number, the SES (wage) of his  parent,
                                                                                                                                                
all right for kids from disadvantaged backgrounds to earn less than equally talented kids from advantaged
backgrounds.)7
and the date at which he is born.   We shall take children as adults-in-formation, and are
concerned with equalizing opportunities among adults for some condition X, which we
shall call ‘welfare.’      The instruments we have available are the tax rates and the
distribution of educational finance among child types at each date.  Since effort is
nugatory, the theory of equal opportunity expounded in Roemer (1998) says that our
objective is to maximize the minimal level of ‘welfare’ among all adults across types,
where an adult’s type is a pair (w, i) , where w is his parent’s wage, and i is the date at
which he is born.   Thus, our problem is to maximize the least level of ‘welfare’ across all
adults who ever live.
To be specific,  at each date we must choose a tax rate of adult income, t, and, if
there are adults with two wage levels (there are never more than two), an allocation of
educational finance (rL, rH) among children of the two types, where    fLrL + fHrH = 1.  A
child from an L family will receive educational investment in the amount t mrL and a child
from an H family will receive t m rH  .  Thus, if wL and wH were the parents’ wages, then
the children will earn, as adults, h(t rL) wL and h(t rH) wH.
We next define the notion of functioning.  We say that an adult’s level of
functioning is a function of her wage and her consumption (after-tax income) -- F(w, y),
where w is the wage and y is after-tax income.   We attempt to capture Amartya Sen’s
idea of functioning, which G.A. Cohen (1993) has characterized as  ‘midfare,’ something8
midway between consumption and welfare.  To wit, we imagine that a person’s wage is a
measure of her level of self-realization, in the sense that it reflects her education, and of
her degree of self-esteem, in a market economy.  (It might be more accurate to capture
the self-esteem effect by her relative wage, but we shall not complexify further.)   We
will in addition assume that F is homogeneous of degree 1,  F(0,y)=F(x,0) = 0 for all x
and y, F is monotone increasing,  and where necessary, we take F to be given by F(w, y )
= w
g y 
1-g, for some 0<g<1.
We now define human development  as an increase in functioning level of adults
over time.  We believe this is consistent with the concept of development, which is not an
increase in human welfare as such, but rather an increase in human capacity.   Capacity,
in our stark model, is a function of consumption and the wage.  The wage is important as
the reflection of education; in addition, it can be argued that self-esteem is a capacity
enhancer, and that, too, is captured by the wage.  Children embody the knowledge of past
generations, through the educational process, and we have attempted to capture this in
our specification of the eduational technology: to wit, a society can reproduce the
knowledge of its adults by investing fraction a of its GNP per capita in all children, and it
can create a more knowledgeable next generation by investing more than a in them.
We now stipulate that at date 0, low wage adults earn 1, and high wage adults
earn r > 1.9
This model has similarities to Arrow (1973), which examined the maximin
criterion in a dynamic framework.   We will remark upon the differences in the
conclusion.
3.  Equality of opportunity for functioning: Model I
Our first exercise is to take the welfare of an adult to be her functioning level .






where     FJ
i
 is the functioning level of adults in the ‘J dynasty’ at date i.   The low dynasty
is the set of persons consisting of the low wage adults at date 0 and all their descendants.
(I shall also sometimes refer to A's dynasty as the set of all of A's descendents.)  The




1 ,..., where we note that    rH
i
 is determined by
   rL
i
 via the accounting identity    fLrL + fHrH = 1.  The level of functioning of L adults at date
i is    FL




i is mean income at date i, and the wages are given
recursively by    wL
i = h(t
i - 1r L
i - 1)wL
i-1
, and a similar formula for the High wage, for all i>0.
It is important to note that, at some date, the wages of the two adult types may be
equalized, and if that is the case, then we stipulate that, thereafter,  since there is only one
type of child, there is no longer any decision concerning how to allocate educational
finance--all children receive the same investment.   We need not consider the possibility10
that a child in the high dynasty has a wage lower than one in the low dynasty at a given
date, for that will never be an aspect of an optimal solution.  It thus follows that at any
date, the functioning level of L adults will be less than or equal to the functioning level of
H adults (where L and H refer to the dynasties, not to the wages of particular adults),
because L adults always have a wage not larger than H adults at the same date, and the







i ³ w L
i , i =1,2,...
(3.1a)
We immediately observe:
Proposition 1.   At the solution to (3.1a),     FL
0 = FL
i
 for all i.
Proof:
1.  We first note that the least well-off adults must be the L adults at date 0.  For suppose
to the contrary that    FL
0 > FL
i
 for some date i.  Then increase t
0  a little and leave all other
variables the same.  We know this can be done, because t
0 < 1: otherwise,    FL
0 = 0,   and
we can surely do better than that.
5   This will decrease    FL
0
 a little, and it will increase    FL
i
for all positive i, because it will increase all wages of L adults at date 1 and after.  So if
the infimum in (3.1) is achieved a some finite i, we have a contradiction.  Moreover, we
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Õ , and since we have increased the first part of this
expression and left the infinite product the same, we have increased the limit.  Thus, if
perchance the infimum of (3.1) is achieved in the limit, we have increased that, too.
2.  Next, suppose contrary to the claim, that L adults at date i had a level of functioning
greater than L adults at date 0.  Now decrease t
0, …, t
i-1 so that the levels of FL
j for j =
0,…,i-1 all increase.  (We can make the functioning levels increase, because decreasing
the tax rate increases the consumption at that date.)  This is possible because, at the
solution, t
j > 0 for all j; for if t
j=0, then, because h(0)=0, the functioning levels of all
adults at date j+1 would be zero, which as we noted, is surely not optimal.  Next, increase
t
i enough so that all wage rates at dates i+1 and on increase.  It follows as well that lim FL
j





k = i + 1
¥
Õ  does not change with the
contemplated perturbations of tax rates.)  We have now increased the functioning levels
of all L adults at generations other than i.  We can make all these changes in tax rates
small enough so that FL
i is not the smallest functioning level, and thus we have increased
the value of program (3.1), a contradiction.  This establishes the proposition.
Proposition 1 establishes that equality of opportunity for functioning is
inconsistent with human development, in the sense that fraction fL of adults at every date
remain at the (low) level of functioning of date 0 L adults.  If, as is reasonable, fL > .5,
then the majority of all adults are held to a low level of human capacity.12
Do the H dynasty adults get reduced, over time, to this same low level of
functioning?  Not necessarily.  Let F have the Cobb-Douglas form. If g is sufficiently
close to 0, then consumption is very important in functioning, and it may pay to keep the
wages of the H adults above the L wage in order to bring about a relatively high mean
income.
A number of colleagues have challenged an assumption of the model at this point,
namely that h(0) = 0.  They say that even with no education, children can earn a positive
wage.      Let us study this objection, by assuming that h(0) = d >0.  Suppose as well that
d<1.  Paragraph 1 of the above proof is unchanged.   Let us proceed to paragraph 2:
assume that for some i, FL
i > FL
0.  If t
0, …, t
-i-1 are all positive, then proceed with the proof
as above.  However, it is now possible that t
j = 0 for some 0 < j < i-1.  Note, in this case,
that
   FL
j+1 =F(w L
jd ,m




This allows us to proceed as follows.  Let i be the first   date at which FL
i> FL
0.  Then
   FL
0 =... =FL
i-1
, and so it follows by the above inequality that t
o,…,t
i-1 are all positive.  Now
proceed with the proof as in paragraph 2 above,  and proposition 1 is again demonstrated.
It follows that we can escape proposition 1 only by postulating that d>1 -- that is,
that even if no public investment is made in a generation of children, they will earn more13
than their parents.  This seems completely wrong.  It is an established view in the growth
literature that, without education, human capital depreciates.
The maximin social welfare function is sometimes criticized for spending huge
amounts of resources to raise the level of welfare of a very small group of individuals
who are very poor welfare producing machines.  Let us note this criticism does not apply
here.  Nobody is extremely handicapped in our environment -- there are no terribly
inefficient welfare-creating individuals.  It is true, however, that L adults at date 0
comprise an arbitrarily small fraction of the adults who have lived up to date T, as T
becomes large, and all L adults are held to their level of functioning. This is surely a form
of ‘extremism’ of maximin , although  it has a different character from the form of
extremism I referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph.  If we contemplate
sacrificing the L adults at date 0, we are led to ask, why do they have less than an equal
right to welfare than those at later dates?  The answer ‘Because it is too costly to their
descendents not  to sacrifice them’ invites sacrificing the L adults, or indeed all adults, at
any finite number of dates beginning at date 0.  After all , this group, too, constitutes an
arbitrarily small fraction of all adults who shall ever live.
4.   Equality of opportunity for welfare: Model II
We now suppose that adults care about the functioning levels of their children, as




her own functioning level , F
t+1 is the functioning level of her child, and u is strictly
monotone increasing and continuous.  Our equal-opportunity program now becomes





where    uJ
i
is the utility of an adult of dynasty J at date i.  We restrict ourselves to requiring
that    wH
i ³ wL
i
, for all i, a requirement that is surely superfluous; we can then write (4.1)
as
Sup Inf    [uL
0,u L
1,...]
s.t.     wH
i ³ wL
i
 for all i. (4.1’)
We have:
Proposition 2  At the solution to (4.1’), the infimum is attainted at date 0.  Furthermore,
there are no two consecutive dates i and i+1 such that uL





1. If the infimum were not attained at date 0, then increase t
0 a little.  This raises utility at
all dates later than 0, and does not lower utility at date 0 to the old infimum.
 2.  Next, suppose that uL
1 and uL
2 are both greater than m, the value of the program.
Then decrease t
1 a little, which increases uL
0  above m.  Now increase t
2 so that




2) has the same value as before the perturbations.  Then all wages from date 3
on remain unchanged, and so the values uL
i for i > 3 remain unchanged.  Since uL
1 and uL
2
were initially greater than m, they still are.15
We have now created a situation where the minimum value of the {uL
i} is at least
m.  There are two cases: either the minimum value of {uL
i} is m and is achieved at some
i>2, or the minimum value is greater than m.  The second case is impossible, since the
value of the program is m.  But in the first case, the minimum value is not achieved at
date 0, which contradicts paragraph 1 of this proof.
This proves that not both uL
1 and uL
2 can be greater than m.   The same argument
shows that no two consecutive utilities can be greater than m.    3
Suppose that each adult cares about his child’s and his grandchild’s level of
functioning.  Then the same argument shows that no three consecutive utilities can be
greater than the value of the program, which is achieved at date 0.
Thus, allowing parents to care about the functioning levels of a finite sequence of
their descendents does not enable us to escape the conclusion that protracted human
development fails to occur.  For it is clear that if the utility level of the L dynasty returns
to the level at date 0 periodically, then the functioning level of one generation must
return, periodically, to the functioning level at date 0 or date 1 or lower, by u’s
monotonicity.  In this society, history repeats itself, condemning every n
th generation to
the level of human development of the primeval ancestor.
It is worth noting that u is any continuous monotonic utility function.  In
particular, an adult may very well prefer that his child function at a higher level than she,
in the sense that , for all X and small d>0,  u(X-d, X+ d) > u (X, X).   This is perhaps16
somewhat surprising: even if adults want their children to function at a higher level than
themselves, in the solution, there is no protracted human development.
5.  Equality of opportunity for welfare: Model III
We now suppose that adults care about their own level of functioning and their
child’s utility.    Suppose there is a concept of utility such that
u
0 = F
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,  for any N;

























Thus, the utility of any adult is the discounted sum of his own and his dynasty’s levels of
functioning.   Caring about the welfare of your children forces you, implicitly, to care
about the functioning of your descendents, all the way down.17
It is reasonable to suppose that this formulation is psychologically accurate.  Are
we parents content if our children are functioning well, or are we only content if they are
happy, where their happiness derives from the success of their children?
Our equal-opportunity for welfare program is stated again as (4.1’), where the
notation now refers to the new concept of utility.
From now on we restrict ourselves to the case b < 1, so that  we may hope that
(5.2) converges.
It is easy, again, to show that the value of program (4.1’) is achieved at the date 0
utility. (If it weren’t , increase t
0, which will increase all functioning levels at date 1 and






i       i=1,2,… (5.3)
       wH
i > wL
i,  i = 1,2,…
Our strategy will be to solve yet another program:
Max  uL
0 (5.4)
  s.t.     wH
i > wL
i,  i = 1,2,…
We will then observe that, at the solution to (5.4), we have  uL
0 < uL
i   , for
    i=1,2,…, and
hence the solution to (5.4) is the solution to (5.3), which is in turn the solution to (4.1’).








where the wages at date  0 are equal and equal to w.  Hence the only instruments are tax































where the last equation uses the fact that F is homogeneous of degree 1.  But the last
expression is just the objective (5.5) where the tax rate is t* at every date!  It follows that
t* is that value that makes the r.h.s. of (5.7) as large as possible.  Differentiating the r.h.s.
of (5.7) w.r.t. t* and setting the result equal to zero generates the following equation in t*:
   F2(1,1 - t*) = (1-b h(t*))
-1b ¢  h (t*)F(1,1-t*). (5.8)
In sum, we have proved:19




, as long as bh(t*) < 1, where t* is the solution of (5.8).





We shall now solve (5.4) in the case where, for some integer N, wH
N = wL
N in the















i , i =1,...,N
(5.9)
where only the N
th constraint binds.  This is simply an application of the Le Chatelier






å is maximized by
taxing, from date N on, at the tax rate t*, by Proposition 3.
Program (5.9) has a finite horizon, and we shall solve it by standard methods. It is
perhaps clearest to do a few examples of (5.9).  First, suppose that wages are equalized at

























We now assume for the duration that h(x) = k x
c.  We form the Lagrangian for this







































Our method is to solve (5.10ab) for (t
0, rL
0) and then to check whether l is positive.
As an example, let fL=.7, fH=.3, b = .7, g= .5, c=.1, a=.04, and calibrate k so that
h(a)=1.  We then compute the solution to (5.10ab) for various values of r, and observe
that l is positive for 1 < r < 1.46.  We also have t* = .755.    Furthermore, we verify that
for all these values of r, uL
0 < uL
1, and the uL
i increase after that.  Hence the solution to
(5.4) is indeed the solution to (5.3), and so we have found the solution to (4.1’), assuming
that, in that solution, wages are equalized at date 1.
Moreover, for all r in the stated interval, t
0 lies in the interval [.746,.756]. Hence
h(t
0) > 1.  Of course, h(t*) > 1 as well.  It is easy to compute that functioning levels
increase forever.  Indeed, since h(t*) = 1.341, from date 1 onwards, the functioning level




We may similarly compute the solution to (5.4) when the first date at which





















i , i =1,2
where only the second constraint is binding at the solution.  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
give us five equations in the four instruments and the Lagrangian multiplier l associated
with the second constraint.   Using the same parameterization as above, we now find that
l is positive as long as r < 1.98.   We again observe that the uL
i are monotone increasing.
Thus, if (4.1’) has a solution where wages are equalized at date 2, then we must have  r <
1.98.
We must caution the reader.  We have shown that, if (5.4) has a solution at which
wages are equalized at date N, then that program is equivalent to solving (5.9), and all
constraints are slack at the solution except the N
TH one.  However, if there is a solution to
(5.9) where only constraint N binds, we do not know that (5.4) has a solution at which
wages are equalized at date N.   The equivalence of programs (5.4) and (5.9) is
conditional upon (5.4)’s having a solution where wages are equalized at date N.
I have carried out the exercise for N = 3 as well.  The tables below present some
of the pertinent results. Note that apparently small changes in b and c cause large changes
in t*, although t* always is greater than a.  For instance, when h(t*) = 1.129, we know
that there is steady growth in functioning of 12.9% per generation at the equal-
opportunity solution.22
Consider the first row of  table 1.  Columns 5 and 6 give the values of the
instruments at r = 1.16.  In particular, EOp mandates that we spend 10.59 as much per
capita on the education of an L child as on an H child.  This only occurs in the first
generation, since wages are equalized at date 1.  Since t
0rL
0 = (.23)(1.36)=.313, we spend
about 31% of per capita GNP (per generation) in educating a disadvantaged child, and
about 3% of GNP per capita per generation  in educating a high SES child. Table 2 gives
values of the instruments at the solution at r = 1.29, when wages are equalized in two
generations.  Note that, in the first generation, four times as much is invested in a low
SES child as in a high SES child, and in the second generation, eight times as much is
invested.  Similarly, table 3 gives the values of the instruments when wages are equalized
at the third generation of descendents of the original adults.
It is not clear how close a semblance to reality the function h I have chosen bears.
One might also question the value of b.  But if these parameters are reasonable, then
intergenerational EOp would have us spend far more on education than OECD countries
currently spend, and with far greater compensatory spending on low SES children.
The discussion thus far has been premised on the assumption that, for some finite
N,  the high and low wages are equalized at the solution of (5.4).  Finally, we must show
that there is a condition under which this is true.







, then for some finite N, the    wH
N = wL
N
 at the solution of (5.4).23






, which makes sense.  If g is
sufficiently large, then functioning depends mainly on the wage (not consumption), and
so there is no reason to keep the wage of the H dynasty higher than the wage of the L
dynasty.
Proof of Prop. 4: (At this writing Prop 4 is still a conjecture.)
5.  Conclusion
Earlier, I remarked on the similarity between the present paper and Arrow [1973].
The main differences between  Arrow’s model and mine are: (1) Arrow’s model has a
representative agent each period, and so the only issue is to maximin welfare of that
agent’s descendents across time; (2) Arrow’s agents care only about consumption, not
about functioning (i.e., not about the wage); (3)  investment is modeled as capital
investment, rather than educational investment.  Mathematically, the main difference is
that the planner has only one instrument each period in the Arrow model, whereas in my
model, she has two instruments.   (This is, of course, due to difference (1) above.)
Nevertheless, Arrow’s results are qualitatively similar to ours: an increase in
consumption over time is compatible with maximin only if the equalisandum is welfare,
in which parents care about the consumption stream of their entire future dynasty.  Thus,
the present paper may be considered an intellectual descendent of Arrow (1973).24
Let me recapitulate.  One of the major foci of discussion in egalitarian theory of
the last thirty years has been the nature of the equalisandum.  All major participants have
moved away from taking welfare as that equalisandum, although it is important to note
that Arneson (1989) has argued for choosing opportunity for welfare as the
equalisandum.  (‘Opportunity for welfare’ is, in general, quite different from ‘welfare’ as
an equalisandum.  That difference is due to differential effort, which in this paper,  does
not appear.)   However, this debate has been carried out within the confines of a static
environment, a ‘model’ with a single generation.   Here, we have argued that equality of
opportunity, for whatever kind of condition, is an ethically viable conception in a multi-
generation world, and that in such a context, it calls for equalizing opportunities across all
types of adult, where an adult’s type is characterized by the date at which he is born and
the SES of the family in which he grew up.   In particular, there appears to be no reason
that a person should fare better than another simply by virtue of being born at a different
date.   An asymmetric version of this principle is familiar in discussions of sustainable
development and environmental preservation: we should leave to future generations a
world as bountiful as the one left to us by our ancestors.  But the other part is just as
compelling: we are under no ethical mandate to leave our descendents a world more
bountiful than our own, although we may decide to do so if that increases our welfare,
by contemplating the happiness it will bring our children, and their children…25
In studying the multi-generation world, we have learned that, if we choose what I
call an objectivist equalisandum -- I have taken ‘functioning’ as an appealing one -- then
equality of opportunity for that condition implies there will be no further human
development, where human development is conceived of not as an increase in human
welfare, but rather in human capacities to function.    Thus, two major characteristics of
what comprises the good society, as it has been conceived of by socialist egalitarians for
several hundred years,  are incompatible.    There appears to be a choice: either we
reformulate our desiderata, perhaps giving up the belief that human development is
indispensable to our notion of the good society, or we look for a different equalisandum.
We showed that if we equalize opportunities for welfare, where an adult’s welfare
depends upon her own level of functioning and the functioning levels of a finite stream of
her descendents,  the 'unpleasant inconsistency' continues to hold.   If, however, we
choose a thorough-going kind of welfare as the condition for which opportunities should
be equalized -- one which declares that an individual’s welfare depends not just on his
capacities and the capacities of his children and grandchildren, but rather on his own
capacities and his child’s welfare, then human development and equality of opportunity
are mutually consistent.
The most appealing solution to the unpleasant inconsistency, I believe, is the
second one.  Arneson (1989) is right, and Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen are wrong: it is
opportunities for welfare that we should advocate equalizing.  But we must add that this26
escape from the unpleasant inconsistency is predicated upon a psychological premise --
that adults care about their own functioning, and the welfare  of their children.  Whether
that is true must be left to psychologists and philosophers.27
REFERENCES
Arneson, R. 1989. “Equality and equality of opportunity for welfare,”
Philosophical Studies  56, 77-93
Arrow, K. 1973. “Rawls’s principle of just saving,” Swedish Journal of
Economics, 323-335
Cohen, G.A. 1989. “On the currency of egalitarian justice,” Ethics  99, 906-44
Cohen, G.A. 1993. "Equality of what? On welfare, goods, and capabilities," in M.
Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Dworkin, R. 1981. “What is equality?  Part 2: Equality of resources,” Philosophy
& Public Affairs  10, 283-345
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice,  Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
Roemer, J.E. 1998. Equality of Opportunity , Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press
Sen, A. 1980. “ Equality of what?”In S. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, Volume 1,  Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press